Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy, and timeliness of MEFs are higher for voluntary forecasters than for mandatory forecasters. Additional analyses show that the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on cost of debt are stronger for voluntary forecasters operating in opaque information environments, issuing high-quality and confirming forecasts, controlled by private shareholders, and operating in highly competitive product markets. Overall, our results indicate that, compared with mandatory MEFs, voluntary MEFs are more informative for credit investors, particularly for firms facing greater information risk and operating uncertainty.     

基于指数随机图模型的专利技术扩散机制实证研究

网络嵌入视角下专利技术扩散路径间存在相关性，但这种网络内生性影响并未在已有研究中得到足够重视。将扩散因素归纳为：专利价值、专利保护、多维同配、结构嵌入，从扩散网络内生、外生因素两个方面构建分析模型，并以石墨烯领域为例，采用指数随机图模型，开展实证研究。实证结果说明：专利价值、技术、地理、组织层面同配性、闭合三角结构嵌入均正向促进专利技术扩散，而专利保护强度反向抑制技术扩散。值得注意的是，专利技术扩散存在强烈的结构嵌入倾向，融合网络内、外生因素的模型能够更好地捕捉专利技术扩散机制。     

Independence in bank governance structure: Empirical evidence of effects on bank risk and performance

We investigate how different governance arrangements affect risk and return in banks. Using a new data set for UK banks over the period 2003–2012, we employ a simultaneous equations framework to control for the reciprocal relationship between risk and return. We show that separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman increases bank risk without causing a concurrent increase in return. We also find that oversight by a Remuneration Committee and Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) lowers the probability of bank failure, indicating that empowering an independent Chairman has different effects from empowering independent NEDs. Overall, our results underline the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity in corporate governance arrangements within banks.     

Institutional ownership,cross-shareholdings and corporate cash reserves in Japan

Cross-country studies document a negative relation between corporate governance and cash holdings. In contrast, this relation is found to be positive in the United States. In this paper, we examine the case of Japanese firms. Using institutional ownership and cross-shareholdings as the main governance variables, we show that better governance is associated with higher cash balances as in the United States. The reason is that better-governed firms make better investment decisions. Their investments are not driven by excess liquidity and result in higher profitability and higher firm valuation. Overall, our findings indicate that management profligacy is a bigger concern to shareholders than management propensity to hoard cash because of risk aversion.     

Does economic policy uncertainty raise corporate precautionary cash holdings? Evidence from China

Using China as the research setting, this paper investigates the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical results show a U-shaped relation between economic policy uncertainty and corporate precautionary cash holdings. Empirical analysis, in terms of ownership structure, firm size, corporate competitiveness and geographical location, further shows that (i) the effects for economic policy uncertainty in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises are significant, but the effect is stronger for state-owned enterprises; (ii) such significant effect is also found more strongly in small and medium-sized enterprises and highly competitive enterprises; and (iii) the effects for eastern, central and western China are all statistically significant, but the effect is strongest for eastern China.     

Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.     

Institutional investors and international investments in emerging economy firms: A behavioral risk perspective

While the extant literature has examined the influence of controlling and non-controlling principals on the internationalization decisions of emerging market firms, heterogeneity among non-controlling principals is largely ignored. The risk characteristics of different groups of owners, shaped by their institutional environments, could contribute to the differences in their preferences for firm internationalization. In this paper, we draw insights from institutional theory and behavioral risk perspective to examine the risk propensities and risk perceptions of various non-controlling principals, such as pressure-resistant (FIIs and mutual funds) and pressure-sensitive (banks, insurance companies and lending institutions) institutional investors. Empirical results from a sample of 2364 unique Indian firms during the 2005–2014 time-period show that, after controlling for firm-level resources and capabilities identified in prior literature, the ownership share of different types of institutional investors is associated with firms’ international investments differently. While pressure-sensitive institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are not supportive of foreign investments by firms, pressure-resistant institutional investors, such as FIIs and mutual funds, are supportive of this strategic decision. Furthermore, our results show that the family ownership in a firm (measured in terms of family shareholding) further lowers the preference of pressure sensitive institutional investors for internationalization, whereas family ownership positively moderates the pressure resistant investors towards internationalization.     

Private benefits from control block trades in the Spanish stock exchange

A control block trade can be explained by the expectation of financial gains, shared by all shareholders, or by the expectation of private benefits, exclusive to the buyer and possibly at the expense of other shareholders’ rents. The market for corporate control contributes to social welfare when it improves the efficiency of the allocation of resources. When the objective of a block transaction is private benefits, social welfare may be negatively impacted as minority shareholders could withdraw from the market. Therefore the estimation of private benefits would allow the efficiency of the market for corporate control to be assessed. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to calculate private benefits in the Spanish market for partial control. Using a sample of partial control transactions over the period 1990–2016, we find that the median of private benefits is negative, therefore it appears that there is no inefficient use of resources in the Spanish partial control market as a whole, however private costs are detected. The variability of private benefits is explained in a significant way by variables related to the control structure of the target firm, such as the controlling position of the buyer after the transaction, the contestability of control and the cross-shareholdings between the buyer and large shareholders. Performance and the size of the firm are significant as well.     

The impact of prudential toolkits on loan growth in Central and Eastern European banking systems

This paper examines the effects of prudential policy on loan growth in 11 Central and Eastern European banking systems, spanning the period from 2000 to 2015. Based on the measures taken by the authorities of our sample countries, we build several prudential indices. Additionally, we control for the effects of several country-specific factors and bank-specific characteristics. Finally, we test the homogeneity of these effects, accounting for cycle, ownership, and bank effects. Generally, the empirical findings reveal a negative correlation between prudential toolkits and credit growth, with a conspicuous impact for tools targeting lending activity. We see that the effects of a change in the lending framework on loan growth are heterogeneous when we account for crisis and cycle patterns. Furthermore, the interaction between ownership and crisis reveals that, in normal times, foreign banks recorded higher loan growth compared to domestic banks. The opposite is true in turbulent times. The analysis of interactions between credit-based measures and bank-specific variables show that the effects of prudential actions depend on the bank size and leverage.     

数字经济对中国全要素生产率的影响机理:提升效应还是抑制效果？

数字经济是新时代引领中国经济高质量发展的关键抓手。然而现阶段数字经济普惠性发展尚未实现，掣肘着其对国内全要素生产率的提升力度。文章在理论分析的基础上，基于熵权TOPSIS法测算了2012-2018年中国数字经济发展水平指数，探讨了中国数字经济对全要素生产率的影响机理。研究发现：数字经济的发展显著提升了中国全要素生产率水平，但区域层面上，东部地区的数字经济发展明显领先于中西部地区，引领着中国全要素生产率快速增长。从全要素生产率的分解指标来看，数字经济推动了技术效率提升，但现阶段国内关键核心技术环节薄弱以及数字产业化带来的人才和资金的虹吸效应导致数字经济对技术进步产生了阻碍作用。此外，当前数字经济对不同产业的渗透度存在明显的不均衡性，筑高了创新资源的流动壁垒，影响产业间协调创新及合理化布局，进而抑制了对全要素生产率的提升力度。进一步的机制检验表明在创新环境的支持下，人才集聚及金融规模强化了数字经济对全要素生产率的提升力度。